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Abstract—We attempt to make two arguments in this essay. 
First, through a case study of a mobile phone based voice-media 
service we have been running in rural central India for more 
than six years, we describe several implementation complexities 
we had to navigate towards realizing our intended vision of 
bringing social development through technology. Most of these 
complexities arose in the interface of our technology with society, 
and we argue that even other technology providers can create 
similar processes to manage this socio-technological interface and 
ensure intended outcomes from their technology use. We then 
build our second argument about how to ensure that the 
organizations behind both market driven technologies and those 
technologies that are adopted by the state, pay due attention 
towards responsibly managing the socio-technological interface 
of their innovations. We advocate for the technology engineers 
and researchers who work within these organizations, to take up 
the responsibility and ensure that their labour leads to making 
the world a better place especially for the poor and marginalized. 
We outline possible governance structures that can give more 
voice to the technology developers to push their organizations 
towards ensuring that responsible outcomes emerge from their 
technology. We note that the examples we use to build our 
arguments are limited to contemporary information and 
communication technology (ICT) platforms used directly by end-
users to share content with one another, and hence our argument 
may not generalize to other ICTs in a straightforward manner.  
Keywords—ICTD, community media, social development, 
technology appropriation, inclusion, exclusion, inequality, political 
economy, codetermination 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is growing concern that although rapid technology 
development has produced amazing outcomes, there have also 
been significant harmful effects for many reasons. Technology 
providers may be unable to control what the technology gets 
used for and by whom, they may not understand the limitations 
of their own technology, the regulatory response of the state 
might be too slow, and the technology may increase 
inequalities by servicing the rich and privileged much more 
than the poor and marginalized. Even technologies specifically 
designed to address certain social development objectives and 
to reduce inequalities, may fail to do so.  
In this context, we try to address two goals. First, we list 
out several reasons because of which technologies may fail to 
produce the intended social development impact. We do this by 
using as a case-study our own experiences of having built and 
operated a voice-based community media service in rural India 
for several years. We understand this initiative most intimately 
as compared to any other systems we have studied in the 
research literature, and therefore we are able to explain in 
detail many aspects that we had to manage beyond just the 
technology to bring impact via this service. Second, we distil 
out specific processes we developed to manage the technology 
and discuss how they can be incorporated in other 
technological initiatives, problems that arise in these initiatives 
when the processes are missing, and how can the organizations 
which operate these initiatives be persuaded to build such 
processes that may require them to go beyond their core task of 
technology engineering alone.  
We begin with giving a background of the community 
media service operated by us, then describe the challenges we 
faced and how we solved them, followed by a discussion of 
other market and state led technology initiatives about what is 
missing in their operations. We also raise an appeal for 
technology researchers and engineers to understand more about 
how the technologies produced by them are used in the world, 
ensure that their organizations do more to manage the use of 
technology, and work towards bringing social development 
through their technology.  
II. BACKGROUND OF MOBILE VAANI 
The concept of community media is centred in the idea that 
the needs of local or interest based communities is best 
understood by the community itself, and editorially driven 
mass media run by external institutions is not able to address 
these needs largely because of their lack of local context. The 
community itself should be able to define the agenda of a 
media meant for it, create its own content, and distribute the 
content to the community. Several such models for community 
embedded media initiatives exist in India itself. Khabar 
Lahariya runs local chapters of rural newspapers written and 
edited by local women, with a feminist perspective [1]. Video 
Volunteers trains community correspondents across the country 
to produce videos about human rights and governance issues in 
their communities [2]. Several community radio stations 
espouse the same perspective and are operated by people from 
local communities who create radio programmes and raise 
funds to sustain the station [3]. In this rich mix of initiatives, 
we started a mobile phone based community media service in 
rural central India in 2012, which works using Interactive 
Voice Response (IVR) systems to enable a voice driven 
communication platform for communities. Our choice to build 
a voice-based platform was driven by low literacy in the 
communities where we wanted to work, for whom voice would 
be more easily accessible as compared to text. Our choice to 
use IVR systems was driven by the rapid growth of mobile 
phone coverage, where even if people did not use the Internet 
due to challenges of affordability or digital literacy, they would 
still be able to use phones to make calls and press buttons to 
navigate content. Our conviction was also shaped with our 
prior experience of having built a community radio automation 
system with an inbuilt IVR feature that got used extensively [4, 
5]. Our reason to look beyond community radio to instead use 
mobile phones was the slow licensing process to get a 
community radio broadcast license in India, and the restriction 
by law of the broadcast being constrained to only 10-15km. A 
service accessible via mobile phones could have a much wider 
outreach, and could be set up and scaled easily without 
licensing restrictions. We were also inspired by the success of a 
few other pioneering initiatives using IVR technology where 
people could call and listen to audio, or record their own voice 
messages that could be heard by other people [6, 7].  
Our IVR initiative, Mobile Vaani (MV), runs in a similar 
manner: People give a missed-call to a unique phone number. 
The IVR system initiates a call back to the callers effectively 
making it a free service for them, and the people use phone 
keypad buttons to browse a list of audio messages or record 
their own message. Any messages recorded by them go 
through a manual moderation process before being published 
on the IVR for others to hear, essentially to filter out poor 
quality audio recordings or undesirable content.  
Our goal with this initiative was to bring about social 
development through the use of technology, along the 
following five lines. First, we were convinced about the 
transparency and accountability function that such a platform 
could play in local governance, by making it simple for people 
to share about civic or governance issues that they were facing, 
and to demand transparency in decision making. Indeed, we 
had seen our community radio system in some locations used 
to run live broadcasts of Panchayat (village level elected local 
governance body) meetings that was much appreciated by the 
community [5]. Second, we had evidence from our own prior 
work in social media analysis [8], that discussions on 
participatory media platforms are specifically useful because 
the homophily effect [9] leads to people receiving information 
from their strong ties [10] which is highly contextual and 
understandable by them, and participation by diverse users 
from across weak ties leads to information that enhances 
completeness. We hypothesized that messages evolve as they 
traverse the social network, gaining both context and 
completeness through comments made on the messages by 
people occupying different positions in the social network 
graph [11]. We therefore believed that since MV could 
facilitate people to share their views and experiences on 
various topics, it could lead to a more complete and actionable 
understanding gained by the people for relevant topics that 
could include health or agriculture or education or potentially 
anything. Third, we had seen a strong community building 
impact emerge from community radio stations through 
traditional songs and music, and coverage of local events, 
which made the community closer knitted [5]. Fourth, we were 
convinced through our own field visits and prior work about 
the self-empowerment that people gain when they can be heard 
by many others, ie. when they gain a voice, and are able to 
challenge exploitative power structures [3]. Finally, we wanted 
MV to have an operations model and a business model that 
could be replicated readily for scaling either by us or through 
partners to bring wider and large-scale impact.  
We therefore initiated MV with a purposive clarity of what 
we meant this platform to become, and the change we wanted 
it to bring about. Our approach was further driven by an 
assumption that these would be the exact impact pathways 
through which social development would arise through use of 
the MV technology. We were wrong, as we explain next by 
highlighting many different challenges we faced in realizing 
this vision, because we had not considered the socio-
technological interface that shapes the use of technology. 
However, by building processes to manage this interface, we 
were finally able to reasonably achieve our vision. We consider 
this as a case for being able to successfully control the 
direction of technology use towards meeting specific 
objectives. We first discuss our own experiences and the 
processes we developed within the MV initiative, and then 
build an argument about possibly how similar ICT platforms 
could be controlled to lead to responsible outcomes.  
III. THE SOCIO-TECHNOLOGICAL INTERFACE OF MOBILE VAANI 
We define the socio-technological interface as the boundary 
with technology engineering and user interface design on one 
side, and factors that shape how people use the technology on 
the other side. We do not mean to suggest that people who 
engineer the technology or design the user interfaces do not 
consider the social context in which the technology is intended 
to be used. In fact, several of their choices may be shaped by 
the social context very much like how our choice for using IVR 
was shaped by the low literacy and high mobile phone usage in 
the communities of interest. The socio-technological interface 
however that we talk about is in the dimension of how the 
technology is used, and not how it is engineered. This 
understanding of technology use is typically considered to be 
the domain of social scientists. Partly by chance and partly by 
design, over time we expanded and diversified our team which 
had earlier been composed of only engineers, to build such a 
social sciences function internally, and converted MV almost 
into an action-research project where we eventually learned 
how to manage different aspects of the socio-technological 
interface to achieve our vision. Some of these aspects and the 
processes we developed to manage them are described next, 
and may generalize to other ICT initiatives operating in a 
similar context because the listed aspects are likely to be 
universal in the given context and similar challenges will be 
encountered by other initiatives as well. The listing of aspects 
we talk about are by no means exhaustive, we do not discuss 
privacy and security for example due to a lack of experience on 
this front, but nevertheless this list is intended to serve as a 
starting point to which more can be added over time. We also 
do not engage in a discussion about whether a particular 
technology is suited to meet a particular objective, our analysis 
is limited to managing how a given technology is used by 
society to meet its stated objectives.  
A. Technology and platform literacy, technology access 
We found that IVR itself was an alien concept for many 
people we interacted with. Our initial entry into the field in 
2012 was through human rights activists working in rural areas 
of Ranchi and Khunti in Jharkhand, with people heavily 
dependent upon government welfare schemes such as NREGA 
(for rural employment) and PDS (for subsidized access to food 
grains). Men had access to phones and were functionally 
literate to use it to dial numbers and pick up calls, but most had 
not used automated IVR systems in the past. The usage of the 
system had to be demonstrated to them, and in the absence of 
any other media in these areas, offline training sessions were 
the most effective 1 . Further, they had to be explained the 
concept of community media and what they could do with 
access to such a platform, but that too was not straightforward 
to convey – it required practical examples and self-validation 
for people to understand the use of the technology. It is 
important to highlight that media penetration in these 
communities is extremely low, for newspapers due to literacy 
issues, and for television due to affordability and electricity 
infrastructure. Finally, access of phones by women, and access 
to women to tell them about MV, were both significant 
challenges. Due to patriarchal norms, women are typically less 
literate, do not own their own phones, rely on shared access, 
and consequently their capability to use phones is lower than 
that of men. Physical mobility of women is also lower and 
hence it is harder to reach women to participate on MV.  
We had to develop low-cost and scalable processes to 
overcome these barriers of technology and platform literacy, 
and technology access. The wide usage of mobile phones was 
clearly not going to easily translate into MV adoption.  
Related work has explored several interesting dynamics 
through which new technologies are learned. Poorly literate 
construction workers were able to learn a complex sequence of 
steps to share videos over Bluetooth, suggesting that self-
motivation to use technology (in this case, for entertainment) 
could lead to self-learning [14]. In a study of Facebook use 
among urban youth [15], a mix of financial and social 
incentives led to users teaching their peers about the platform. 
In the context of women, [16] observes that despite strong 
patriarchal norms, women learn to navigate family and 
community spaces to learn how to use mobile phones.  
We came across similar dynamics in MV as well. Users 
would tell their friends about it especially if their message got 
published on MV. Some would listen to MV in groups which 
led to wider listening and learning. Hearing stories of 
validation of MV’s impact especially in the area of grievance 
redressal which we explain later, also led to MV achieving 
strong social credibility and popularity through word of mouth. 
These were however not systematic and reproducible processes 
that could be considered as part of a replicable MV model. We 
in fact made an attempt at formalizing these processes by 
giving a financial incentive to users to train other users, but it 
got misused and devolved into spamming as users falsely 
claimed having trained some people, but whose phone numbers 
had been acquired from mobile shops and spam databases. We 
therefore took a different approach, as explained next, to 
develop an innovative low-cost offline process through 
                                                          
1 In a different context and some years later we also ran 
experiments to show that offline learning was most effective 
to train users on IVR, as compared to delivering a training 
over a phone call, or broadcasting instructions over radio [13]. 
community volunteers which could manage this need to create 
technology and platform literacy.  
B. Community embeddedness and usage definitions 
As a community media platform, MV espoused a vision 
that its agenda should be driven by the community itself, 
including the moderation process, choice of content topics, etc. 
Related work has discussed the concept of communitization of 
technology [17], ie. when a community learns the essence of 
what a piece of technology can do and is able to leverage it for 
the community’s needs. The study highlights the role that a few 
key technology savvy community members play in the process. 
These people are termed as Human Access Points (HAPs), and 
are essentially more technologically advanced users who 
understand both the needs of their community and the 
capabilities of the technology, to be able to realize relevant 
use-cases for the technology.  
This notion of HAPs most closely explains our own 
methodology to communitize MV, and it happened organically. 
Through different partner organizations, as we were introduced 
into new communities, we kept coming across HAPs who 
quickly understood the technology and were among its early 
adopters. To gain faster popularity for MV in the community, 
we inducted people from among the HAPs as community 
volunteers, and built a financial incentive model to cover for 
out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the volunteers to 
popularize MV and guide its usage. They would travel to 
different villages and tell people about MV, demonstrate its 
usage, and encourage its adoption. We however realized that 
most of the MV volunteers may not be able to manage the time 
for content moderation themselves, plus due to their limited 
exposure to computers worsened with flaky Internet access in 
small towns and rural areas, we decided to retain the 
moderation function centrally within our team 2 . We 
encouraged the volunteers though to discover use-cases for the 
platform on their own, based on their understanding of the 
community [18]. As a result, over time when MV expanded to 
different locations running their own local MV chapters, the 
volunteers created their own topic priorities for respective local 
MV chapters. The volunteers in one location where MV was 
heavily popular with farmers, built linkages with the local 
agricultural institutes to answer questions put up by farmers. 
Another chapter built linkages with school and college 
coaching classes to advice their predominantly youth userbase 
with career counselling. Almost all the locations also took up a 
hyperlocal news reporting function that we discovered to be a 
universal need in all the MV areas of operation, understandably 
due to the scarce penetration of any other media.  
We also supplemented the platform with content created by 
our team, on cultural and entertainment themes, discussions on 
social norms such as early marriage and domestic violence, 
rules and regulations behind different government schemes, 
                                                          
2 It is only now as of 2018, more than six years after we 
started MV, that we feel Internet access is good enough and 
rich smartphone apps can be developed for content moderation 
instead of browser based content management, that we have 
started thinking again about building the originally envisioned 
distributed moderation model for MV.  
etc. The choice of this content was guided strongly by feedback 
processes we developed to interview some regular users over 
the phone, conduct focused group discussions in the 
community, and also run IVR-based surveys to get user 
feedback [18]. In this way, even though we retained the 
moderation process centrally, we were able to achieve a good 
community embedding of MV through its volunteers and a 
process of continuous communication with them.  
Our journey with identifying and training volunteers, and 
retaining them, was however by no means smooth. We next 
discuss the question of internal accountability expected of the 
volunteers to build MV into a sustainable institution in itself.  
C. Sustainability and internal accountability 
Initially MV started as a state-wide service in Jharkhand 
that was popularized in different areas by the volunteers. 
Subsequently, we started services also in Bihar and Madhya 
Pradesh. Our field team however consisted of only a few 
people who began to find it difficult to coordinate with dozens 
of volunteers from across different locations. Further, volunteer 
attrition became high because we discovered that many people 
would join MV as volunteers with the expectation of financial 
returns, but the small stipend we offered did not provide them 
with a strong monetary incentive. We realized that we had to 
improve our selection process to identify volunteers who were 
genuinely interested in bringing a positive change in their 
communities and for whom these social incentives would be 
stronger than the monetary incentives, and also build structures 
for the volunteers to be able to motivate and inspire each other. 
The concept of federated groups in the context of trade unions 
has been suggested as being more resilient than a single large 
group [19], and we adopted this method.  
We split the state MVs into district level local chapters, 
each of which had its own unique phone number and could 
build its own identity [20]. Further, we grouped the volunteers 
from each district into a volunteer club for that district. The 
club elects a coordinator and meets on a monthly basis to 
discuss their activities and plan for the way forward. Through 
this hierarchical arrangement, our field team now only had to 
engage with the club coordinators. Further we found that this 
structure also built a strong solidarity and mutual 
accountability among the volunteers, and reduced attrition to 
practically zero. We also developed an elaborate financial 
incentive model as a combination of a group incentive that was 
divided equally among all the volunteers in the club (calculated 
pro-rata on the number of active users in each club) and 
individual incentives for each volunteer (based on the number 
of good quality contributions by the volunteer, and offline 
community mobilization activities organized by them). This 
model further made explicit the ethos that a volunteer club 
should act as a single unit to which all the volunteers were 
expected to make individual contributions to achieve the club’s 
collective aim. The club model helped us realize the kernel for 
MV operations. It has already been tested with replication at 
thirty local chapters, and can be scaled readily for large-scale 
coverage and impact. However, as we explain next, this still 
left us with a few unanswered questions about the ideal 
volunteer profile to select and consequent processes for 
outreach by the volunteers.  
D. Appropriation and empowerment, inclusion and exclusion 
The unique position of power occupied by the MV 
volunteers poses several risks. The volunteers can popularize to 
the users an altered vision of MV more relevant for them based 
on their individual socio-economic-political views and 
priorities which could be different from that of their clubs. 
They can similarly prioritize creating access for a select group 
of users by training them well while excluding others. It is also 
possible that the volunteers may have the best of intentions to 
facilitate equitable access but their ability may get impeded by 
socio-cultural norms they find hard to transcend themselves. 
We found all such dynamics taking place in practice.  
As an example, during the initial days of MV, several 
volunteers were associated with human rights activist 
organizations and hence they were more interested in 
governance topics to the extent that they would discourage 
people from using MV for cultural expression through folk 
songs and poetry [20]. In another case, a class-based conflict 
arose in a club when a lower-class volunteer was elected as a 
club coordinator. Such incidents have now become rare due to 
the more rigorous selection and training methods for 
volunteers, but what was useful for the MV team to make the 
necessary course corrections was an openness to hear 
complaints that the users recorded on MV or shared with us in 
field meetings. This roughly designed internal grievance 
redressal process helped empower the users, and helped us to 
uncover such cases of undesirable appropriation of technology.  
A challenge which still remains however is in overcoming 
the technology gender divide. Most of the MV volunteers are 
men and find it hard to reach women to tell them about MV. 
Having a female volunteer in a club of all male volunteers is 
also difficult in the dominant patriarchal cultural setup of rural 
India. An all-women MV club was also started and despite all 
the volunteers being extremely dynamic, the active userbase of 
the club remained low due to the limited mobility of the 
women volunteers to reach other women. It is worth 
mentioning that in a recent project we worked with a large 
women Self Help Group (SHG) network and were able to 
reach many women through SHG meetings [21]. The regularity 
of the SHG meetings which take place for financial 
bookkeeping, and the exclusive women constituency to which 
we gained access, provided us with an opportunity for both 
targeted outreach to women as well as repeated interactions 
with them to encourage technology adoption. Gaps still remain 
though. For instance, meetings with SHGs of very poor women 
were held irregularly since the women were busy with work 
and hence those who could potentially benefit the most from 
access to the platform were excluded even via this pathway.  
To summarize, we succeeded although not completely to 
manage the socio-technological interface in MV about biases 
in inclusion and exclusion that arose due to characteristics of 
the social context, or even due to appropriation of the 
technology by those who were more powerful and adept users 
of the technology. Not tackling this challenge stands the risk of 
increasing the inequalities that exist in the social context, 
because the more powerful or adept users of technology are 
able to leverage it for their agenda and move further ahead, 
leaving the others to play a perpetual catch-up game [22].  
E. Social and institutional credibility 
It is reasonable to expect that sustained participation and 
utilization of a technology platform will only happen once the 
expectation of the users is met. MV is popularized as a 
community media platform with several characteristics and 
use-cases pitched to the users. Some of the significant 
examples include: “It is a platform for you to talk about 
whatever you feel is relevant for you and your community”, “It 
is to highlight news that is relevant for you in your daily life, 
and not what is sensational”, “You can get breaking local news 
way before any newspaper or TV channel”, “You can discuss 
local and national policy, and we will convey your feedback to 
the right stakeholders”, “MV is a platform where you will get 
useful information on agriculture, career counselling, health, 
government schemes, among other topics”, “MV volunteers 
will help resolve problems that your community is facing, 
especially on welfare entitlements and public services”, etc.  
We would like to explain the context of the users so that the 
importance of meeting these expectations can be better 
understood. Regional newspaper and television media has not 
deeply reached these communities, and also has a chequered 
reputation of having ignored problems of lower caste people, 
or having suppressed news against the local elite possibly even 
in return for payment. The poor and marginalized groups have 
historically lacked a strong voice in the community, and even 
their political representation has had its own ups and downs. 
They are also intimidated by complicated government office 
processes for grievance redressal, and may not be able to take 
time off their daily livelihood routine to pursue even legitimate 
cases of violation of their rights and entitlements. In such a 
context, when MV is positioned as making several strong 
promises to the extent that it will enable the people to 
overcome the social inequalities in which they live their daily 
lives, then if the expectations of the users are not met they will 
dismiss it cynically as yet another fake promise.  
MV was able to gain significant social credibility by 
showing evidence that helped people validate its stated 
promises and intentions. The editorial processes of moderation 
have been kept liberal, and only filter out poor quality audio 
messages, or those that appear to be politically motivated or are 
spoken in a rude tone. Towards the initial stages of MV, the 
moderators would even make phone calls to users who seemed 
to be wanting to say something important but were not able to 
articulate it well, and guided them to be able to make better 
audio recordings 3 . Similarly, grievances recorded by the 
people, or questions asked by them, are rigorously followed-up 
by the volunteers with reminders and support provided by the 
moderators, to be able to convey to users about action having 
been initiated upon their requests. All the MV volunteers are 
also trained on news reporting to cover news events that they 
                                                          
3 These manual guidance calls by the moderators were later 
discontinued when the userbase grew and enough resources 
were not available to sustain this function. Currently, an 
automated call is made whenever an audio message is rejected 
from publication, and pre-recorded tips are provided on how 
to make good quality recordings. Going forward as the MV 
distributed moderation function shapes up, we plan to 
reinitiate guidance calls to be made by the volunteers.  
come across. These functions of grievance follow-up and news 
reporting, in addition to informing users on technology and 
platform literacy about MV, form a significant part of the 
offline work done within the MV ecosystem by the volunteers 
to ensure strong social outcomes.  
A recent survey of several hundred MV users showed that 
67% of the users agreed that it is different from other mass 
media in giving an opportunity for anybody to voice 
themselves, 69% acknowledged the value of dialogue created 
on the platform to understand different viewpoints, 88% 
reported an increase in connecting back to their cultural roots, 
85% reported an increase in political awareness, 50% 
acknowledged having learned new ways to articulate their 
views, 64% reported having gained agency in addressing 
problems with local governance directly themselves, and 84% 
acknowledged strong offline support received from MV 
volunteers in helping solve their problems.  
A categorization of different impact pathways of MV is 
provided in [23], constituted on the basis of close to a hundred 
indepth interviews of users, on different types of learning and 
agency effects experienced by them. A further detailed 
discussion of social accountability loops created by MV is 
provided in [24], based on 300+ impact stories shared by the 
users on MV. The argument is generalized in [25] through a 
collection of case-studies of IVR-based projects which were 
used to create new information flows that brought transparency 
and empowered users to demand better quality in the delivery 
of public services. [24, 25] also emphasize that the target 
beneficiaries of welfare schemes are much in need of offline 
support via social workers to demand their rights and 
entitlements because self-service mechanisms like centralized 
helplines and web portals can end up being disempowering as 
they are hard for the people to use. Furthermore many 
categories of grievances arise due to issues at the local level 
and cannot be resolved through centralized mechanisms. MV’s 
network of volunteers not only provided such offline support to 
overcome the disempowerment of the people in engaging with 
the government authorities, but are also able to use MV to 
channelize the attention of government officials towards 
specific grievances and bring about high rates of redressal.  
 To summarize, the platform processes of moderation and 
editorial policies, and offline processes by the volunteers of 
user outreach, support, and follow-up on user requests, were 
able to meet user expectations and were critical for MV to gain 
social credibility. This in turn created other effects to facilitate 
strong word-of-mouth popularization of MV by users who 
benefited from it and readily endorsed it.  
Institutional credibility too is important for MV to be able 
to get constructive reactions from the state for grievance 
redressal or policy implementation feedback given by the 
users. As the MV volunteers built stronger networks with local 
government officials, and demonstrated sustained usage over 
many years, we found that the state too responded positively 
and viewed MV as an innovative means of citizen engagement 
that they could utilize themselves. Local government officials 
now routinely use MV to make announcements of new 
schemes and subsidies, give interviews about their views on 
policy implementation, offer a commitment for resolution of 
grave issues, and respond actively to requests by MV users and 
volunteers. Institutional credibility thus reinforced social 
credibility, and helped embed MV not just with the community 
but with other local institutions as well.  
F. Influence of the business model on agenda 
So far we have explained how we managed many aspects 
going beyond the technology of MV into its interface with the 
community and local institutions, and we have built an 
operations model that can be replicated and scaled. The final 
aspect we discuss next is the MV business model, so that MV 
can be scaled and made financially sustainable.  
We have three revenue streams as part of the MV business 
model. First, philanthropic donations and government 
advertising to fund awareness and behaviour change campaigns 
on topics such as health, nutrition, education, and livelihood. 
Second, community funding where the users may themselves 
contribute small amounts for their community media platform, 
plus crowd-funding to raise micro-grants for specific activities 
and sponsorships from economically well-off people. Third, 
commercial advertising by companies interested in reaching 
rural markets. While there is strong validation of the first 
revenue stream, the second is completely untested as of now, 
and the third is yet to be tested at scale.  
We believe that all three revenue streams will kick-in 
sooner or later, be it on IVR or on a future mobile application 
running on data services, since there is a lack of appropriate 
media outreach channels for Indian rural markets. What we do 
not know however is what challenges will come up in 
sustaining the unbiased and community driven coverage 
provided on MV currently. As the revenue streams from 
government or corporate advertising get larger and MV’s 
dependence on them increases to ensure its financial 
sustainability, MV is likely to become susceptible to have its 
agenda get influenced by government and corporate interests. 
We do not have any experience so far in building processes to 
manage this likely forthcoming challenge, since MV has until 
now been sustained either through philanthropic grants or 
internal funding by Gram Vaani through positive margins 
made on other services.  
IV. MANAGING THE SOCIO-TECHNOLOGICAL INTERFACE 
We showed in the previous section how the MV team 
diversified from its core expertise in technology engineering to 
take on a more action research oriented approach towards using 
technology for social development. Our key objective with 
giving a detailed description of our experiences was to 
demonstrate the complexity of problems that had to be 
understood and solved to achieve a reasonable degree of 
success. We showed that indeed the use of technology for 
development is complex, but it is possible to build processes 
and ensure that the technologies can be controlled towards 
leading to responsible outcomes. The very same problems are 
likely to arise for other ICT platforms as well, which will hit 
upon similar challenges and will have to manage the same 
socio-technological interfaces. Our goal in this section is 
therefore to attempt to generalize the processes developed in 
the MV context so that they can be incorporated in other 
technology initiatives as well, where ICT platforms are used by 
the end-users directly to share information, especially towards 
achieving certain social development outcomes. Not being able 
to manage the interface between technology and society stands 
the chance of technologies that were meant to be empowering 
for people, to actually disempower them, or some of them.  
Distilling from the MV experience, the following specific 
processes were employed to manage its socio-technological 
interface. The processes are listed as headings in the 
enumeration below and the aspects of the socio-technological 
interface they specifically help address are underlined in the 
description alongside.  
1) Federated setups: These make management of the ICT 
platforms easier and allow for both contextualization and 
diversity in the use of the technologies. Smaller communities 
can build specific usage definitions according to their needs, 
which can also lead to greater community embeddedness of 
the technology, rather than expect all users to have a uniform 
worldview about it. This embeddedness may be brought about 
through a subset of users who can mediate as community 
representatives, either online or offline.  
2) Internal feedback processes: Platform providers can get 
regular feedback about the platform usage from users on 
aspects such as the following.  
a) Grievance redressal: This can alert about cases of 
misappropriation of the technology by malicious users, or 
malfunctioning of the technology itself, both of which are 
likely to happen in any ICT platform. Being able to address 
these issues promptly can contribute towards social credibility 
of the platform in the eyes of its users, and also empower and 
incentivize them to have the ICT platforms not get misused.   
b) Tracking of inclusion and exclusion: Biases in access 
or usage arising from gender or other categories of inequity 
can be spotted, the reasons behind the biases can be identified, 
and appropriate action can be taken. This can help avoid an 
increase in inequalities through inclusion and exclusion biases 
arising from inequities in the social context itself that 
constrains access to the technology for different usergroups.  
c) User interests and context: ICT initiatives can learn 
more about the interests of their users to be able to build 
relevant usage definitions leading to more appropriate 
products and services. Most platforms do this extensively 
through implicit learning of user preferences which is also an 
issue of debate on privacy as ICTs facilitate access to detailed 
data about user actions. Platform providers however rarely 
engage in getting closer to the users to understand them, 
especially if the users inhabit a different context like being 
situated in a different country or being from poorer 
backgrounds, and the platform providers do not get explicit 
feedback from the users that can help shape the service 
directly towards specific social development goals.  
3) Design of incentives: Managing federated setups and 
building a closer feedback loop with the end-users may 
require more efforts and hence higher resource costs for the 
platform providers. Appropriate incentives can therefore be 
built to involve the users themselves or their community 
representatives in the management of the platform, like in 
managing federated setups or providing feedback, ultimately 
costing much less. Suitable social, solidarity, and monetary 
initiatives can lead to strong sustainability and internal 
accountability outputs, and create long standing community 
embeddedness. Further, being able to align the incentives with 
positive social change as an overarching objective may lead to 
greater participation by the users towards platform 
management and build its social credibility.  
4) Processes to address gaps in technology and platform 
literacy: Not all users can be expected to have a good 
understanding of how to use the technology, and what it could 
be used for. Tracking inclusion and exclusion metrics, and 
usage profiles, through the feedback processes mentioned 
above, can help spot specific biases that could be arising from 
this disparity in technology and service literacy. Appropriate 
steps can then be taken to bridge the gaps. Depending on the 
context, this gap could be bridged through online mechanisms 
or it may require offline mechanisms as well, and it may be 
undertaken by the institution administering the ICT platform 
or it may require incentive mechanisms for the users or 
community representatives to participate. Sometimes bringing 
about this technology and service literacy may not be 
straightforward or even possible, and in such cases processes 
to facilitate assisted usage may be needed. All such steps can 
significantly avoid disempowerment effects that some users 
may notice from their inability to learn to use new 
technologies easily. 
5) Offline processes to meet the stated social development 
objectives: This is especially important for ICT platforms 
aimed at achieving some promised social development 
outcomes. This is likely to need offline processes, well aligned 
incentives for the participating users and community 
representatives, and institutional linkages with external 
stakeholders, over and above the capabilities of the technology 
itself. Even if simpler outcomes are promised to the users, it is 
likely that the technology alone may not be sufficient and the 
ICT initiative will still need to build operations beyond the 
engineering of the technology alone. If the platform operations 
are able to establish a clear link to the expected outcomes, it 
will lead to the platform achieving high social and institutional 
credibility. Further, the linkages between the platform and 
external stakeholders should be such that they empower the 
users: over-centralization and automation has been seen to 
result in disempowerment effects when people are not able to 
utilize the links due to various social contextual factors.  
 
We argue that ICT initiatives should embody these 
processes to be able to manage the socio-technological 
interface for their innovations. To summarize, this interface in 
the given social context to build ICT platforms for poor and 
marginalized users in India, is defined through its aspects to 
address societal gaps in technology literacy, platform literacy, 
and technology access; build community embeddedness and 
clear usage definitions for the people intended to use the ICTs; 
achieve sustainability and build processes for internal 
accountability; guard against technology appropriation by a 
few users, which especially in conjunction with societal biases 
can lead to biases in the inclusion and exclusion of certain 
usergroups, and in turn lead to greater inequalities; achieve 
strong social and institutional credibility by meeting 
expectations of the users; and create a business model that can 
bring financial sustainability but not compromise processes 
required to manage the rest of the aspects. Other ICT platforms 
in a similar social context are likely to stare at the same socio-
technological interface and may need similar processes. We 
next describe a few other ICT platforms and the fallouts if 
strong processes are not built to manage the interface.  
V. TOWARDS CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGY 
Now that we identified several aspects of the socio-
technological interface that lead to undesirable outcomes from 
the use of technology, and processes that can be developed to 
manage this interface, we next move to the question of how 
can it be ensured that the technology providers put efforts 
towards managing this interface? Further, can realizing social 
development outcomes from technology be made a paramount 
objective of technology development itself? We start with 
laying out problems noticed with some popular technology 
platforms in managing their socio-technological interfaces, we 
then describe similar problems seen with some technology 
platforms led by the state, discuss the broader political 
economy which influences the priorities of market and state 
driven technology platform providers, and finally give 
examples of corporate governance structures that may help 
ensure that technology providers pay due attention to 
managing their socio-technological interfaces. 
A. Laissez-faire market driven technology expansion 
Our approach with MV lies in sharp contrast with how ICT 
initiatives otherwise typically interface with society, placing 
emphasis largely on the technology engineering for achieving 
popularity and scalability, without adequate care about 
managing its socio-technological interface. The first example 
that comes to mind is Facebook which has lost considerable 
social and institutional credibility over recent years for the 
limited attention it paid to check the presence of echo 
chambers and filter bubbles created through its operating 
models and the metrics it chose to optimize, slow efforts to 
detect fake news when malicious users appropriated it for 
various political and monetary gains, ability to control data 
leaks, etc. Mis-appropriation happened even with Digg, even 
though it was conceived as a democratic space to counter the 
rich-get-richer phenomena on search engines and blogs, and it 
gave strong agency to the users to select content, but yet a few 
users were able to subvert these processes for political gains. 
Platforms like Reddit and Slashdot on the other hand, have so 
far shown resilience to such cases of appropriation. They have 
a strong moderation system mediated by people, and Reddit in 
fact is set up as a federated system which allows different 
communities to build their own standards. Other extremely 
successful collaborative knowledge building platforms like 
Wikipedia (and even Quora to an extent) similarly have strong 
moderation policies and a somewhat implicit federated 
structure defined mostly on the basis of topic interests of users. 
Facebook however it seems has only lately scaled centralized 
human driven moderation processes, and AI to detect 
problems, but its architecture is inherently not geared towards 
empowering users to take over the administration of diverse 
federated community groups, or at least is not used effectively. 
Rather the push seems to be in the direction of building 
universal community standards across all users of Facebook.  
This effort to bring standardization in an inherently diverse 
society seems at least to us an exercise doomed to failure by 
definition. We argue that first, when such ICT platforms are 
deployed for use by people, people will undoubtedly use them 
for different agenda and consequently management will 
become an issue, therefore it is important to design the 
architecture of the ICT platform upfront with the 
acknowledgement that the socio-technological interface of the 
platform will need to be managed towards responsible 
outcomes, and that this is an inescapable eventuality. Reddit 
and Slashdot seem to be strong success stories here in having 
thought through the architecture design beforehand itself. 
Second, it is entirely understandable that even after sufficient 
forethought, this interface may still throw up unforeseen 
aspects. New processes will then need to be developed to 
manage them, and therefore it is again the prerogative of the 
ICT platform providers to acknowledge their responsibility and 
understand this interface to be able to manage it. Even though 
platforms like Facebook may not any explicitly stated social 
development goals, but it is clearly irresponsible to leave it to 
external investigators and researchers to point out societal 
problems that could be arising from their platforms, while they 
simply focus on scaling their platforms and scientifically 
optimize the usage targeting self-serving metrics only.  
This brings us to WhatsApp. The WhatsApp architecture of 
allowing users to create their own groups and managing them, 
is closer to a federated and user driven setup, although we do 
feel that the tools available to the administrators are primitive 
and a lot more can be done. However, the encrypted nature of 
communication makes it practically impossible for anybody to 
manage it, and WhatsApp has nearly absolved itself of any 
responsibility towards facilitating more appropriate 
administration of its forums. Only now in India has it started 
holding workshops on fake news, but which remain at a 
minuscule scale; other methods even through online tools to 
create better technology literacy could be far more effective. 
Laissez-faire market driven technology expansion does not 
seem to have paid much attention either to understanding the 
suitability of different architectures, or to aim for responsible 
metrics and user incentive structures instead of those that link 
towards profit and shareholder-value maximization, or to 
ensure better literacy of its users towards the technology and 
services. This ideology of market driven rapid growth has 
undoubtedly enabled communication and collaboration at 
unprecedented scale, and which has been used for strong social 
development outcomes as well, but it is the missing element of 
acknowledging the need to manage the socio-technological 
interface that is our primary criticism. Not being able to 
manage this interface leads to many undesirable consequences, 
as has been noticed with so many large ICT platforms 
including Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, etc. 
These problems are not constrained just to the kind of 
information sharing ICT platforms we primarily discuss here. 
AI technologies are also criticised for their bias, often arising 
due to biases in the training datasets and the absence of 
feedback loops about when the predictions of AI systems make 
mistakes [41]. Several efforts are underway to bring fairness, 
accountability, and transparency in AI systems [42], but we 
believe that even with these technological modifications, there 
will be a need to go beyond just the technology engineering to 
manage different aspects of the socio-technological interface, 
especially those dealing with technology literacy so that users 
are made aware of possible limitations of the technologies and 
remain alert enough to spotting issues which they can raise 
through suitable internal grievance redressal processes.  
We turn next to the question of how it can be ensured that 
market-driven ICT platform providers manage the socio-
technological interface, after first a discussion of gaps in state 
driven technology expansion, and a possible explanation of the 
political economy that seems to be driving the market and the 
state in their methods of technology expansion.  
B. State driven technology expansion 
The state needs to hold itself up to even higher standards of 
responsibility in the technologies it chooses to use. This is 
justified since the technologies are likely to be funded through 
tax-payer money, and may get deployed at very large scales, 
even possibly through coercion by mandating citizens to use 
them. We take the example of Aadhaar, which is not exactly an 
ICT platform meant for end-users to communicate with each 
other, but a significant use-case on the platform is for end-users 
especially the poor to execute welfare related transactions with 
small and large businesses, which exposes Aadhaar to similar 
challenging aspects of the socio-technological interface.  
Aadhaar is arguably a fitting demonstration of the high-
modernism ideology of the state to bring simplification and 
legibility of its population towards being able to administer 
them more easily [26]. It has allegedly been instated through 
unconstitutional means, has been pushed through coercion by 
the state, and driven for straight mass adoption without 
adequate testing and piloting of the technology. This has led to 
many issues especially grave problems faced by the poor, 
which clearly could have been avoided had more attention been 
paid to the socio-technological interface. Better user feedback 
processes could have been built. Campaigns to bring about 
better technology and service literacy could have been 
conducted. The capability of the users and their context could 
have been understood better, to support them with mechanisms 
like offline linkages for assistance instead of building over-
centralization and self-service mechanisms which end up being 
disempowering for them. Alternate methods to conduct 
transactions instead of Aadhaar could have been allowed, 
especially given that unforeseen problems could arise in a mass 
rollout of such new technology. In fact, leave aside the 
acknowledgement of the presence of unknowns in the socio-
technological interface, the technology engineering itself has 
had issues that made Aadhaar seem like an irresponsible move 
without adequate testing for robustness of the technology 
working in the wild.  
Further, it is debatable whether Aadhaar was the right 
choice of a system to meet the stated objectives of reducing 
corruption and leakages in welfare benefits4. Other systems 
that empower users by bringing more transparency and 
accountability in welfare services provisioning, have been seen 
to work and could have been good alternatives to Aadhaar [44]. 
The alternative we are alluding to here is a village-level SMS 
alert system piloted in Uttar Pradesh that would push SMSes to 
the recipients of subsidized food in the village, whenever a new 
delivery of grain, kerosene, and other food products was made 
to the fair price shop in their village. Armed with this 
information, people from the village were then able to evade 
tactics of the shopkeeper to withhold food under the pretext of 
not having received the required quota of products from the 
government, which the shopkeeper would siphon off to private 
channels of distribution. Such a system was empowering for 
the community and community based institutions, and built up 
their confidence in demanding their rights and entitlements for 
public services in general. The Aadhaar method however 
resorted to the use of biometrics which failed in the field, 
problems arose due to incorrect details filled in carelessly by 
enrolment agencies that could not be corrected through any 
easy means, disempowered the users not equipped to handle 
complex technologies and protocols like OTP verifications, 
and disempowered the community institutions who were 
rendered helpless to help the communities.  
Policies like demonetization also bring out the arbitrariness 
of the state in policy formation and its capability for coercion 
towards compliance, hence on the one hand it is not altogether 
surprising that ICT policies like Aadhaar were handled 
similarly by the state, but on the other hand it speaks about the 
general attitude of the state which in this case can be argued to 
be unethical on all of political, moral, and scientific grounds.  
C. Contemporary political economy around ICTs 
What can explain these dominant ideologies for market and 
state driven technologies to achieve massive scales yet not pay 
adequate attention to managing the socio-technological 
interfaces? It is not hard to understand the market rationale for 
scale, bring driven by surplus financial capital looking for 
investments, and the ability of ICTs to transcend geographical 
barriers that sometimes limit other industry sectors from 
catering to a global market. Such investments only eye profit 
and shareholder-value maximization, always aimed at 
optimizing only performance metrics that lead to financial 
gain. Achieving social development gains is not a priority for 
such institutions, it is only an incidental outcome. Their only 
priority is to not violate any laws or regulatory requirements in 
their pursuit of profit, and also make efforts to influence the 
regulation through strong lobby networks with the state. This is 
the part we want to touch upon, and also from the other side, of 
the state’s willingness to associate with them.  
                                                          
4 We want to clarify that the appropriateness of system design 
is not the primary focus of this essay, rather it has been framed 
in terms of managing the socio-technological interface which 
arises after a given system has been designed. We regardless 
do digress somewhat in the context of Aadhaar to be able to 
present a more complete discussion.  
The state may have at least three incentives to associate 
with large ICT providers. First, the state’s ideology of high-
modernism can benefit from the surveillance potential of ICT 
platforms, or use these ICT platforms for its own propaganda. 
Second, especially in democratic setups the politicians are able 
to make promises to citizens of easy change through rapidly 
scalable technology, and are assisted by media to a significant 
extent, as we explain later, in building up the hype of benefits 
that can emerge from the technologies. Third, allowing the 
platforms to operate with light regulation, and creating new 
spaces for them such as the large industrial ecosystem that has 
emerged around Aadhaar, may provide the state with new rent-
seeking opportunities. This complex of interlocking ideologies 
between capital and the state that allows both to pursue their 
respective goals, has led to rising inequalities [27, 28], we have 
also found that the interlocks are getting stronger over time 
[29], they influence policy [30, 49], and the mass media itself 
has been appropriated, possibly through choice rather than 
coercion, which limits its ability to influence public opinion on 
appropriate policies [31].  
Even if public opinion does become strong to the extent 
that in democratic setups it can overcome the power of state-
capital interlocks and force the state to both act responsibly on 
its technologies and to also exercise regulation on market 
players for technologies being pushed by them, it raises a 
concern about whether regulation can indeed keep pace with 
that of technological development? It seems we do not have 
strong evidence so far about this possibility, or even to define 
frameworks in which to think about regulation. This probably 
leaves one other factor to shape technological development 
along more responsible lines, competition, but which too seems 
to be compromised due to the near global monopoly enjoyed 
by most ICT platforms in wide use today. In fact, the tendency 
of capital to centralize itself actually drives industries towards 
less competition [47], and it is even arguable whether new 
technology disruptions can be assumed to arise and reset the 
balance in the future [48].  
This brings up critical questions that even in such a market-
state political economy of today, can market driven ICT 
platform providers be made to pay closer attention to managing 
the socio-technological interfaces touched by their platforms to 
avoid negative outcomes? Can they be made to aim for social 
development outcomes rather than financial outcomes? Can the 
state also be made to manage well the socio-technological 
interfaces for platforms adopted by it? We next outline some 
possible directions which may help move towards these goals.  
D. Mastering the social control of technology 
There are differing perspectives about the interaction 
between technology and society. The theory of technology 
determinism suggests that technology and its development 
follows its own logic and ultimately shapes society, leading to 
eventual progress [32]. The theory of social shaping of 
technology suggests instead that society shapes what 
technology gets created and how it gets used [33]. The most 
relevant to our discussion is however Collingridge’s analysis of 
the question: “can we control our technology – can we get it to 
do what we want and can we avoid its unwelcome 
consequences” [34]. He raises an important dilemma that when 
a technology is young and can be controlled then too little is 
known about its harmful consequences, but when the 
technology gets widespread then it becomes hard to control 
because of its entrenchment which increases the costs for 
change, increases debate, and even gives the status quo an 
unfair advantage to argue against change. Decisions about 
controlling the technology therefore may get shaped by many 
social and political forces, and may often need to be made 
without complete knowledge. Our effort in this essay has been 
to highlight that rather than make decisions in the dark to shape 
the technology, many aspects of the socio-technological 
interface that lead to harmful consequences are already known 
and if the technologies are built around architectures that 
embody the kind of processes listed above, it may well be 
possible to make informed decisions and manage the socio-
technological interface towards responsible outcomes. 
However, as discussed in the previous section, it seems that 
the regulatory potential of both markets and states is limited to 
ensure that adequate attention is paid to following such due-
diligence processes to control technology. This leaves the 
people – the consumers and producers of these ICT platforms – 
to redefine the priorities of the platforms. This we feel needs be 
done on two fronts, to ensure that the socio-technological 
interfaces of the technologies used or built by them are 
managed responsibly, and the technologies lead to social 
development outcomes for the poor and marginalized. We 
believe that there is enough talent in the world to address the 
first goal of responsible management of the socio-technological 
interface, it is just that it needs to be done without exception. 
The technology engineers and researchers whose labour is 
producing these technologies, can redefine internal 
organizational priorities to meet this goal. Likewise, consumers 
of the technologies can also shape the direction of use given 
suitable technology architectures that empower the users, and 
given sufficient consumer awareness to be able to exercise 
their influence. The second goal of working towards the needs 
of the poor and marginalized is, we believe, the only 
worthwhile goal so that the poor can equally benefit from 
technologies that have serviced the privileged, and define what 
new technologies should be developed, otherwise inequalities 
will continue to expand because the underserved will be left 
trying to catch-up to levels that continually become harder to 
reach since the privileged will be able to build and use 
technologies for themselves to advance further ahead [35]. 
Historically, the state and market have significantly shaped 
what technology gets built and marketed, and who the intended 
user is, why then for once cannot we build technology with the 
poor and marginalized as its primary users? 
Such a redefinition of priorities by the workers was 
attempted as part of the Lucas Plan in 1976 in UK [36]. Lucas 
Aerospace was a company involved in the manufacture of 
aerospace components, and was considering restructuring and 
layoffs when the workers put together a plan of how the same 
aerospace technologies of the company could also be put to use 
for socially beneficial products, and save jobs too. The workers 
followed what is today known as a human centred design 
approach to conceive these products – they visited hospitals, 
old-age homes, etc to come up with designs, conducted market 
research exercises to understand the commercial potential, and 
finally recommended a plan to the management. This plan 
included products like vehicles for mobility of physically 
disabled people, portable life-support systems that could be 
used for medical emergencies, etc, and some were even built 
and used. Although the plan was eventually rejected by the 
company, the Lucas Plan is referred even today as a model of 
how the workers took control of what they wanted to do with 
the technology they built. Mike Cooley who led the Lucas Plan 
movement, in his book Architect or Bee, refers to a comparison 
that Marx drew between an architect and a bee, where “the 
architect is able to imagine a plan and then erect it through his 
labour by subordinating his will to his plan, which helps the 
architect achieve consonance with his purpose” [37].  
How can producers of a technology be empowered to be 
able to determine what the technology gets used for, and ensure 
that the socio-technological interfaces are managed well to lead 
to the intended outcomes? There is reasonable precedence for 
some methods. German corporate boards have a notion of co-
determination where worker representatives, typically from 
recognized trade unions, are able to participate in the 
management of their companies [38]. They are able to shape 
working conditions and economic decisions of the company, 
and could become conduits to channel worker preferences 
about technology use as well. The same idea of creating 
diversity in the board representation to improve corporate 
governance could be extended to also include social scientists 
in the board, who can ensure that the companies pay attention 
to the socio-technological interface. Another proposal 
suggested in [45] is to revisit a Code of Ethics for engineers 
that was originally formulated by IEEE in the 1970s, 
emphasizing upon disclosure and whistleblowing, and rejecting 
the assumption that the market could guarantee social 
outcomes arising from technology. The social development 
sector also has a lot to offer to deal with the complexities of 
technology use, having understood since long that technologies 
or any interventions do not operate in a vacuum, and are 
influenced by numerous social-cultural-economic aspects that 
need to be managed as part of an overall programme design 
targeted at specific outcomes [39]. They have developed 
systematic methods to conceive theories of change, specify the 
indicators to measure, the measurement methods, and ongoing 
feedback processes for concurrent monitoring to be able to take 
informed decisions for any corrections in the programme 
implementation [40]. Finally, the methods to identify relevant 
problems to solve and how, have also seen systemization [43], 
and hundreds of innovation incubators around the world offer 
guidance to entrepreneurs and innovators to spot tough social 
challenges and figure out how to solve them.  
Assuming suitable governance structures can be formed to 
ensure that technology providers responsibly manage the socio-
technological interfaces, there however remains an inherent 
risk for market-based enterprises to attempt to go beyond the 
technology engineering. It is expensive to do so, probably more 
error prone and risky than the engineering itself, and more 
complex simply because of the larger number of variables that 
may influence the outcomes. This can impact the financial 
sustainability and business model of the enterprises. Even if 
some new financing methods like social bonds are used to 
finance the operations, it leaves unanswered the question of 
how to price the investments made in the enterprises. The 
platforms of competing enterprises may also differ in 
complexity and hence their cost, but it is not necessary that 
complex platforms which might be more expensive to operate 
will also lead to stronger social development outcomes. 
Measuring the outcomes may not be straightforward either. 
These are important questions for different communities of 
research and practice to engage with, and define the way 
forward, possibly through suitable tax structures or even in 
terms of alternate institutional structures such as platform 
cooperatives [46] that can compete with yet operate differently 
from typical market based enterprises of today.  
As technology gets more complex and driven by skilled 
manpower who are given space for their creativity arguably 
unlike the Marxist proletariats5, we feel the answer may lie in 
realigning the relationship between the technology providers, 
the producers working within the provider organizations, and 
the users of the technology. Of course, for this to work, the 
technology producers will need to step out from their core 
engineering roles to interact with users of the technologies they 
have produced, to understand their context and close the 
distance between themselves and the users.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
As new technological development takes place at a rapid 
pace, it becomes important to learn how to control the 
technologies so that their intended outcomes can be achieved 
and the technologies can serve towards social development of 
the poor and marginalized, empower them, and reduce 
inequalities. We have described several processes operating at 
the interface of technology and society that can help manage 
the outcomes arising from the technology, especially for ICT 
platforms which enable end-users to share information with 
one another. We also highlight the need for suitable corporate 
governance mechanisms to ensure that such processes are 
implemented by the ICT platform providers. This essay is also 
to emphasize to technology researchers and engineers that they 
should look beyond their role in just technology design, to 
understand its interface with society, persuade their 
organizations to ensure that responsible outcome arises from 
the technologies developed through their labour, and redefine 
what technologies should be developed in the first place by 
                                                          
5  We acknowledge that whether or not the white-collar 
workers of today have more agency than the blue-collar 
workers, is a debatable topic. Writings of Harry Braverman, 
Charles Wright Mills, and Emil Lederer appear to suggest 
otherwise that even the political ideologies of the two groups 
have diverged. However, recent employee protests at 
companies like Facebook and Google over the unethical use of 
technology, and even gender equality at the workplace, were 
successful in drawing a responsible response from the 
management, and may indicate greater agency in the hands of 
the workers. We remain optimistic and strongly believe that 
educational institutions need to nurture this awareness right 
from the start in the engineers they produce. We are 
attempting to put together a course structure on ethics in 
applied CS towards this goal [50]. 
situating the poor and marginalized as the primary users of 
these technologies. Only then will technology really enable 
societies to overcome the inequalities that exist all around us, 
and not increase these inequalities further. All of us can 
together shape such a future.  
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